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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article provides a state law perspective on the post-scandal, post-
reform audit committee. Federal laws, along with NYSE and Nasdaq
(together, "SRO") rules, recently have made sweeping changes in corporate
governance, including numerous provisions that bear on audit committees.
These changes are unprecedented and dramatic, and rightly have received
wide attention and careful study. Certain basic principles underlying the
governance functions and duties of audit committees, however, originate in,
and are still determined by, state law. Moreover, state law applies to all
corporations while federal law and SRO rules on audit committees apply
only to those companies coming under federal law or SRO coverage. This
Article describes how audit committees fit into the governance arrangement
ordained by state corporate statutes; how longstanding state fiduciary duties
will affect post-reform audit committees; and how, on a variety of issues,
federal law and SRO rules will interact with the pre-existing state law
system to alter the functions of audit committees and how their conduct is
assessed. It closes with some brief observations on how audit committee
reforms dovetail with other reform efforts-such as the new SEC "reporting
up" rule-to reflect a reconsideration of the lawyer's ethical and legal role
in corporate governance.
[Vol. 47:27
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II. BACKGROUND; REGULATORY APPROACH
States, not the federal government, traditionally have regulated
corporate governance. This legal landscape dramatically changed with the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act' ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "Act"), the
promulgation of SEC rules under that Act, and the adoption of new SRO
listing standards. Today, on some corporate governance subjects, including
regulations affecting audit committees, the law comes from three sources-
state law, federal law, and SRO rules.
State corporation law fundamentally differs from the recent
governance initiatives of federal law and SRO rules. First, unlike the
statutory mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley, and in sharp contrast to the detailed
SEC and SRO rules promulgated thereunder, state corporation statutes are
largely enabling, not regulatory, in thrust. State corporate statutes do
contain mandatory provisions; however, they are not strong constraints and
often can be avoided through planning. Significantly, under state law much
discretion over corporate affairs is left to the board of directors and its
committees. Second, federal legal mandates are legislative and
administrative in origin, whereas much state corporate law-especially that
dealing with fiduciary duty concepts-derives from equity and is created by
judges. Third, federal law and SRO rules adopt a rules-based approach to
corporate governance, in contrast to the more fluid standards and duties-
based approach of judicial analysis under state law. Fourth, the new
initiatives largely avoid the subject of private remedies for wrongdoing; the
state law system of direct and derivative claims for fiduciary breaches
remains intact, though federal law and SRO rules will influence it. Finally,
the new federal and SRO rules largely accept as given state corporate law's
basic allocation of decision-making responsibility within corporations.
However, in certain areas-including the composition and functions of
audit committees-federal and SRO rules both specify structural change
and alter how directors and committee members must operate, matters state
law largely leaves to director judgment. As a result, audit committees are
now governed by both new federal and SRO rules on the one hand, and
traditional state law concepts on the other.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
2005]
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III. CORPORATE STATUTES AND THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
A. Board of Directors Holds Broad Authority and Discretion
State law provides that the business and affairs of every corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.2 Not
only is the board granted plenary authority over corporate affairs, the
manner in which it exercises that authority largely is left to the discretion of
directors. For the most part, corporate statutes do not specify what directors
are to do in directing corporate affairs, or how they are to do it. The same is
true with respect to corporate officers; corporate statutes say remarkably
little about what officers are to do or how they are to do it.
B. Committees
The board of directors has the power to create committees, including
audit committees, and to appoint directors to serve as members of those
committees. 3 In Texas, the articles of incorporation or bylaws must
authorize the board to create committees.4 Even though members of the
audit committee now must meet federal and SRO standards for
independence and perform specified functions, the audit committee remains
a committee of the board and must be created and charged by the board.5
Subject to certain exceptions for non-delegable, full-board functions,
committees may exercise the full powers of the board.6 An audit committee
may exercise board power over a company's audit matters. Federal law and
SRO mandates for audit committees are congruent with wide-ranging
authority for audit committees under state law.
Some corporate statutes specify that the creating of, delegation to, or
action by, a committee does not alone constitute compliance by a director
with the required standard of conduct for a director. 7 The comment to the
2. See Del. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2002).
3. See Del. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (Supp. 2004); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.25(a).
4. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
5. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2) (Supp. 112002)) ("[t]he audit committee of each issuer, in its
capacity as a committee of the board of directors"); see also id. § 205(a), 116 Stat. at 773 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)) (defining an audit committee as a committee "established by and amongst
the board of directors").
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36(A); MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(d).
7. See infra Part IV; see, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36(D) (stating the
"designation of a committee of the board of directors and the delegation thereto of authority shall
not operate to relieve the board of directors, or any member thereof, of any responsibility imposed
[Vol. 47:27
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Model Business Corporation Act ("Model Act") section expressly cautions,
"directors may not abdicate their responsibilities and avoid liability simply
by delegating authority to board committees. 8
State corporate statutes are largely silent on the subject of audit
committees. Except for Connecticut,9 it appears that most state corporate
statutes do not require an audit committee. Again, except for Connecticut,
state corporate law does not specify the size or composition of an audit
committee (other than the general requirement that members of board
committees be directors), nor does it mandate the qualifications of
committee members or the functions or processes to be followed by an
audit committee. These matters are all left to the judgment of the board of
directors or the committee itself, as the case may be.
C. Director and Committee Member Reliance on Others
State corporate statutes typically allow directors and committee
members to rely on various persons.' 0 These statutes vary in wording and
must be read carefully. The wording of these statutes may differ from state
to state as to the persons upon whom committee members may rely, and as
to the preconditions for proper reliance. The Delaware and Texas statutes
are set forth in the Appendix as examples.
1. Certain Points about Delaware's Reliance Statute Warrant Attention
(a) The director must rely in "good faith."
'"I
(b) The director may rely upon information, opinions, reports or
statements made by officers, employees or committees of the
board if those materials were "presented to the corporation."',
2
Materials must be presented to directors or committee members in
their capacity of acting on behalf of the corporation. Reading the
CFO's views as reported in an interview with the newspaper, for
example, would not qualify.
(c) The director may also rely upon materials presented to the
by law"); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(f).
8. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25 cmt. at 8-141.
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-753 (West Supp. 2005).
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.30(c)-(e).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e); see infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the meaning of "good
faith").
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e).
2005]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
corporation by any other person if (i) the director reasonably
believes the matter is within the person's professional or expert
competence; (ii) the person was selected with "reasonable care";
and (iii) the expert or professional was retained by or on behalf of
the corporation.1
3
Importantly, although Delaware, unlike most states, does not have a
general statutory standard of care for directors, the director-reliance statute
imposes a reasonable care obligation on directors in selecting professionals
or experts upon whom directors wish to rely. 14 This statutory reasonable
care requirement, along with the good faith obligation, indicates that
directors and committee members must meet a threshold fiduciary standard
in choosing to rely on professionals (such as lawyers or accountants) or
experts (such as an audit committee's financial expert).
2. Certain Points about the Texas Reliance Statute Warrant Attention
(a) The director or committee member must act in "good faith."'
' 5
A director is not acting in good faith "if the director has
knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes reliance.
. unwarranted."
16
(b) The director must act with ordinary care in relying on others. 17
(c) The Texas statute does not limit reliance to those materials
presented to the corporation, as the Delaware statute does. The
materials need only be those concerning the corporation.1
8
(d) Although it may be implicit, the Texas statute does not
expressly limit reliance on experts or professionals to those
retained by or acting on behalf of the corporation.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.4 1(D) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
16. Id. Also, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently interpreted the Texas reliance
statuteas requiring that defendants must affirmatively show that they relied in good faith. Gen.
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 2005 WL 1523848, at *5 (5th Cir. June 29, 2005). This is in contrast
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D. Director-Reliance Statutes and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
State corporate statutes continue to allow the board of directors to rely
on materials, such as statements and reports, prepared or presented by the
audit committee, provided the board, on an ongoing basis, meets the
statutory requirements for relying on the audit committee. Members of the
audit committee, in turn, may rely on other persons. For example,
committee members may rely on the financial expert as to matters specified
by statute, which the financial expert specially undertakes to prepare or
present, provided they reasonably believe the matters are within the expert's
competence. Members of the audit committee may rely on legal counsel or
other professionals retained by the committee. Members of the board and
members of the audit committee should be able to rely on accountants,
provided the audit committee is composed as required by federal law and
performs the functions specifically assigned by federal law and SRO rules;
without affirmative reasonable assurance that federal and SRO mandates
have been followed, directors run the risk that they may be deemed to have
knowledge that makes their reliance unwarranted.
This last point applies more generally to director reliance under many
corporate statutes (including that of Texas). For example, such reliance is
not proper if a director (and this may vary from director to director) has
knowledge about a matter that makes reliance on another person or group
unwarranted. A director with special accounting skills or training may not
be warranted in relying in a situation where an untrained director might be
warranted in so relying. Likewise, one or more directors with information
unknown to other directors may not be able to rely as broadly as other
directors. Members of the board and members of the audit committee,
therefore, may rely on others-subject to the qualifications noted-but such
reliance does not alone constitute compliance with the member's directorial
responsibilities or with the required standards of good faith and due care
discussed in Part IV below.
IV. AUDIT COMMITTEES AND STATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Statutory Standards of Conduct for Directors
Forty states have enacted a statutory standard of care for directors. 19
Delaware and Texas do not have such a statute. As noted earlier, however,
Delaware's director-reliance statute does provide that directors may rely on
professionals or experts only if the director relies in "good faith" and only if
19. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 annot. at 8-177 (2002).
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such persons have been selected "with reasonable care., 20 The Texas statute
also permits reliance if a director acts in "good faith and with ordinary
care."
21
Many states (including Delaware 22 and Texas23) also have enacted
statutes partially addressing director (and, in some statutes, officer) conflict
of interest transactions, but not addressing other aspects of the director (or
officer) duty of loyalty, such as, for example, usurpation of corporate
opportunities, wrongful competition with a corporation, or appropriating
confidential information-all matters implicating a director's duty of
loyalty.
B. Director Fiduciary Duties
Courts impose various fiduciary duties on corporate directors.
Delaware's fiduciary duties are those of due care, loyalty, and good faith.
Good faith is probably best understood as a component of the duty of
loyalty, but it is sometimes spoken of as a distinct duty. These duties are not
generally framed as precise rules, but instead are expressed as general
duties or standards. Duties and standards are more open-textured, fluid, and
context-sensitive than rules. One drawback of rules in the corporate
governance area is that they heighten the risk of "freezing" current
practices, whereas standards, being more open-ended, are more conducive
to allowing and encouraging change and growth in corporate practices.
1. Judicial Emphasis on Structure and Process
In general, over the past several years Delaware courts largely have
developed a "process-oriented" approach to judicial review of the director
duty of care, and a "structure and process" approach to judicial review of
the director duty of loyalty, at least in the conflict of interest setting. This
approach has characterized Delaware's approach to the review of
committee conduct as well-whether special litigation committees,
committees charged to review transactions with self-interested directors, or
committees established to respond to tender offers.24 It can be expected that,
in reviewing the conduct of audit committees, courts will likewise focus on
their structure and composition, as well as their procedures.
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
21. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41(D).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
23. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.35-1 (Vernon 2003).
24. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90-94 (Del. 2001); Kahn v. Tremont
Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428-29 (Del. 1997).
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2. Duty of Due Care
The duty of due care specifies the manner in which directors must
discharge their legal responsibilities, not the substance of director decisions.
The duty of due care arises in both the discrete decision-making context and
in the oversight and monitoring areas. In the decision-making setting-
whether it involves directors making a routine business decision or
responding to a high-stakes unsolicited bid for corporate control, or
anything in between-the duty of care inquiry clearly focuses on a board's
"decision-making process. 25 Directors in that setting are under an
obligation to obtain, and act with due care with respect to all material
information reasonably available.26 Gross negligence is the standard.27
Directors, due to their statutory responsibilities to direct the business
and affairs of a corporation, also have a duty to properly monitor and
oversee the business affairs of a corporation. Failure to do so properly may
constitute a breach of the duty of care. The Delaware Supreme Court has
not yet addressed whether negligence or gross negligence is the proper
standard of conduct in the oversight context, as opposed to the business
judgment context.28 As famously noted by former Chancellor William
Allen, this monitoring and oversight obligation "includes a duty to attempt
in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may ... render a director liable., 29 Importantly,
however, noted Chancellor Allen's dictum, "only a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists-will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."3 °
If one focuses on certain language--"sustained or systematic failure"
or "utter failure"-the Caremark standard of care for directors in the
oversight context seems very low. Often overlooked, however, are repeated
references in Caremark to a director's "obligation to be reasonably
informed, ' 31 and the duty "to exercise reasonable oversight," 32 as well as
25. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); see
also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Due care in the decisionmaking context is
process due care only.").
26. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994).
27. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
28. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding
that outside the business judgment setting, the care required is that of an ordinarily careful and
prudent person).
29. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
30. Id at 971.
31. Id. at 970-71.
32. Id. at 971.
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the statement that directors must act to "assure a reasonable information and
reporting system. 33 Thus, director failure to act reasonably in the oversight
area may allow an inference of bad faith or, more likely, such inaction may
constitute a breach of that facet of due care requiring directors to be
"reasonably informed., 34 What it means to be reasonably informed is
different in corporate law today-after Sarbanes-Oxley-than in 1996, (the
year of the Caremark decision) before Congress mandated adoption of
certain governance reforms, including internal processes aimed at providing
"reasonable assurance" regarding the reliability of corporate information. In
Caremark, Chancellor Allen noted the relevance of federal law-in that
case, federal organizational sentencing guidelines35--to understanding
director governance responsibilities under state law. Likewise, Sarbanes-
Oxley may infuse new meaning into state law notions of "reasonable"
oversight in a way that leads courts to demand greater director and
committee member vigilance under the reasonableness standard of
Caremark.
3. Director Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation. The duty of loyalty has a well-recognized dimension
prohibiting a director from preferring his or her own interests to the
interests of the corporation. Accordingly, a director may not engage in an
unfair self-dealing ("conflict of interest") transaction, wrongly usurp a
corporate opportunity, improperly compete with the corporation, or use
corporate assets or confidential company information for personal gain. The
mere absence of a personal, conflicting interest by a director, however, is
insufficient, by itself, to fulfill the affirmative aspect of the duty of loyalty.
The Delaware Chancery Court has observed that a breach of loyalty can be
unintended and can occur even when board action is taken in good faith,
and even where self-interest is absent.36 As the chancery court has noted, "a
fiduciary may act disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal
pecuniary interest; and.., regardless of his motive, a director who
consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders
may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he
causes." 37 Recently, both the "affirmative and harm-avoidance" dimensions
33. Id.
34. Id. at 970.
35. Id.
36. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A.17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *8
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000); see also Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch.
1988).
37. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000); see also Hoover Indus., Inc.
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of loyalty were reiterated by Chancellor Chandler: "[T]he 'duty of
loyalty.., imposes an affirmative obligation to protect and advance the
interests of the corporation and mandates that [a director] absolutely refrain
from any conduct that would harm the corporation."'
38
In a variety of settings raising loyalty concerns, Delaware courts have
given guidance as to the structure and process elements likely to enhance
judicial approval of committee performance. 39 Director disinterestedness
and independence are vital, as is care in gathering information and in
deliberations, along with the use of independent legal and financial
advisors. These factors will remain important as courts review audit
committee behavior.
4. Director Duty of Good Faith
The obligation of good faith has long been important to fiduciary
analysis in corporate law, but its meaning has been somewhat nebulous.
Recently, good faith has been receiving considerable attention. A recent
statement by former Chief Justice Veasey helps in understanding the
breadth of this concept:
It is all about process, and process is all about due care and good
faith, as well as loyalty. In my opinion, good faith requires an
honesty of purpose and eschews a disingenuous mindset of appearing
or claiming to act for the corporate good, but not caring for the well-
being of the constituents of the fiduciary. Although the concept of
good faith is not fully developed in the case law, and factual
scenarios are difficult to formulate, an argument could be made that
reckless, disingenuous, irresponsible, or irrational conduct-but not
necessarily self-dealing or larcenous conduct-could implicate
concepts of good faith. If the board's decision or conduct is irrational
or so beyond reason that no reasonable director would credit the
decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some circumstances,
be inferred.40
v. Chase, No. CIV.A.9276, 1988 WL 73758, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 13, 1988) ("A director does
breach his duty of loyalty if he knows that the company has been defrauded and does not report
what he knows to the board .... ").
38. In re Walt Disney Co., No. CIV.A.15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *5 n.49 (Del. Ch. Sept.
10, 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting BelCom, Inc. v. Robb, No. CIV.A. 14663, 1998 WL
229527, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 1998)).
39. See Gregory V. Varallo, William M. McErlean & Russell C. Silberglied, From Kahn to
Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 BUS. LAW. 397, 400-01 (1998);
see, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc.,
638 A.2d 110 (Del. 1994); In re MAXXAM, Inc., Nos. CIV.A.12111, 12353, 1997 WL 187317
(Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1997).
40. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 447 (2003); see also Hillary A.
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Vice Chancellor Leo Strine also has commented on how the notion of
good faith may play a more prominent role in fiduciary analysis: "Enron
might exert pressure on courts to look more carefully at whether directors
have made a good faith effort to accomplish their duties."' Asserting that
good faith goes to director "state of mind,' '42 Strine identifies certain kinds
of director conduct that may call good faith into question. These include "a
failure to monitor if [the directors'] laxity in oversight was so persistent and
substantial that it evidences bad faith. ' 43 It can also arise in situations where
"committee members knew that their inadequate knowledge disabled them
from discharging their responsibilities with fidelity. . . . [Here,] the court
will be called on to conclude that a director who is conscious that he is not
devoting sufficient attention to his duties is not acting in good faith ....
Finally, in language especially important to audit committee members, the
Vice-Chancellor stated:
If an overly busy person serves on the boards of five public
companies[,]... takes on challenging duties on each of those boards,
and then finds himself in a situation where one of his companies is
accused of serious wrongdoing that the board arguably should have
prevented, he should not be surprised if his good faith comes under
severe attack in the financial press and in the courts.
45
Chancellor William Chandler also shed new light on the meaning of
the duty of good faith in In re Walt Disney Co.46 The Chancellor noted that
the complaint in that case did much more than portray directors who were
grossly negligent; rather, it suggested "the defendant directors consciously
and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't
care about the risks' attitude concerning a material corporate decision.
' 47
He stated that such "deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty
to act faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct.., that may not have
been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the
company. 4 s In other words, deliberate indifference to the director duties of
care and loyalty, or consciously disregarding those duties, is conduct
sufficiently faulty to indicate a lack of the required motive-i.e., good
Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 482-95 (2004) (explaining extensively
the concept of good faith).
41. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1373 (2002).
42. Id. at 1386.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1393.
45. Id. at 1395.
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faith-of advancing the best interests of the company. The court, in
assessing director behavior, is not substantively evaluating conduct, but is
drawing an inference about the propriety of director motive from the nature
of the conduct. This allows the court an indirect method to accomplish what
the business judgment rule precludes-consider the substance of director
conduct, not for the purpose of assessing it outright, but to draw an
inference of bad motive if it is sufficiently egregious.
49
Overall, these authorities suggest that the key issue with respect to
analyzing good faith is whether the directors' motivation and purpose was
to advance the corporation's interest. Lawyers advising boards and audit
committees must keep director eyes focused on this overarching concern:
What, in the judgment of directors, is best for the corporation? The absence
of proper motivation can be inferred in a variety of ways. These include:
approval of a substantively irrational course of conduct; acting with
deliberate indifference to known risks; reckless failure to disclose; knowing
violation of applicable law; seeking entrenchment of director positions;
acting with an awareness that as directors they are not fully discharging
their fiduciary responsibilities, as by deliberately acting without sufficient
knowledge, hastily, or in a manner that fails to devote sufficient attention to
those responsibilities; and egregious process failures that suggest a lack of
concern for advancing corporate interests.
C. Members of an Audit Committee Owe the Same Fiduciary Duties as
Directors
As directors perform their numerous functions as audit committee
members, they are subject to all of the fiduciary duties applicable to
directors.
V. STATE LAW PROTECTIONS AGAINST DIRECTOR AND AUDIT
COMMITTEE MEMBER LIABILITY
There are several state law protections against director or audit
committee member liability.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
In Delaware, the rule is described as a "presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
49. See Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (noting that a
business decision may be "'so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith' (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co.,
542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988))).
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in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. '50 A useful statement of the rule's elements is
found in Brehm v. Eisner5' From this simple statement-and later case law
elaboration-several undisputed points about the Delaware rule emerge.
The rule applies to directors.12 The rule's application to officers is not
established in case law.5 3 "[T]he rule applies to directors when they act
collectively, that is, as a board or as a committee of the board .... 354 "[T]he
rule applies only to considered director judgments, not to unconsidered
inaction., 55 To obtain the rule's protection, directors must be independent
and disinterested as to the matter acted upon.56 Directors must act with due
care and in good faith.57 The due care inquiry is process-oriented and due
care is measured by a standard of gross negligence, not simple negligence.5
The burden of proof is on the party challenging the board's decision, to
establish facts rebutting the presumption in favor of upholding the
decision.59 Unless a plaintiff succeeds in rebutting the rule, the court will
not substitute its views for those of the board's if the latter's decision can be
"attributed to any rational business purpose., 60 This last point reflects the
well-known substantive deference shown by courts to board decisions. As a
result of this "hands off' approach, plaintiffs rarely win duty of care cases.
Importantly, the business judgment rule protects only business
decisions. The Delaware Chancery Court has ruled that the issue of whether
a contract violates Delaware law "does not fall into the realm of business
judgment; it cannot be definitively determined by the informed, good faith
judgment of the board.",6' Consequently, audit committee members will be
50. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
51. 746 A.2d 244, 264 & n.66 (Del. 2000).
52. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
53. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS.
LAW. 439, 439-40 (2005).
54. Id. at 454; see also R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey IV, Director Care, Conduct,
and Liability: The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 BUs. LAW. 35, 56 (2000) ("[T]he
business judgment rule applies both to the decision and to the decision-maker, whereas [Model
Act] section 8.31 addresses only the individual liability of a director.").
55. Johnson, supra note 53, at 454-55; see Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("[T]he business
judgment rule operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role
where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to
act.").
56. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
57. Id.
58. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 n.31 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
59. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
60. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.65 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
61. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Del. 1996), overruled on other grounds by
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protected by the business judgment rule only for "business" decisions, not
for their interpretation of new legal mandates imposed upon them. They
may, however, as noted earlier, rely on legal counsel, where appropriate.
B. Statutory Exculpation
Most states, including Delaware, 62 permit stockholders to approve a
provision in the company's certificate of incorporation that reduces or
eliminates the personal liability of the director for monetary damages.
Importantly, the Delaware statute does not eliminate any fiduciary duties of
directors; rather, it simply permits stockholders to approve a provision
eliminating director liability for damages for a breach of the duty of care.63
Directors remain subject to equitable relief such as an injunction. Moreover,
Delaware's statute does not permit elimination or reduction of liability for
breaches of loyalty or good faith.64 Given the growing judicial interest in
reviving the duty of good faith, directors today may face a heightened risk
of liability for damages for breaching this duty even if they fulfill their duty
of due care. Furthermore, at least in Delaware, corporate officers cannot be
exonerated from liability through an amendment to the certificate of
incorporation.65 Consequently, any officer who breaches his or her fiduciary
duties, including the duty of due care, faces full liability exposure.
C. Reliance on Experts
As noted in Part II, directors, including those acting as audit committee
members, may rely on professionals (e.g., legal counsel) and experts (e.g.,
financial experts), and other specified persons. Provided that the specific
terms of the statute are fully complied with, these statutes can offer
important liability protection.
D. Indemnification
States permit indemnification of directors, thereby reducing director
exposure even as to matters not exculpated.66 Indemnification for federal
securities law wrongdoing may violate public policy. Consequently, it is
important that fiduciary duty breaches continue to be characterized as state
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254.




66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(B)
(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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law violations in order for directors and audit committee members to be
indemnified.
VI. THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL LAW, SRO RULES, AND STATE LAW
ON AUDIT COMMITTEES
A. Overview
First, members of audit committees now have three sources of
obligations: federal law, SRO rules, and state law. In a sense, audit
committees and their legal counsel now must understand-and be guided
by-three different legal "languages." It being unlikely that any of the three
sources will go away or that they will merge into a common scheme of
regulation, for now lawyers and audit committee members simply must be
"tri-lingual."
Second, the legal sky is not falling on audit committees. Federal law
and SRO rules now specify in considerably greater detail the composition
and functions of audit committees. Efforts to comply with these mandates
of course are motivated in large part by a simple desire to be law-abiding.
These legal reforms, however, have generated serious (and healthy) self-
examination of audit committee practices by directors and lawyers, and will
dramatically alter the norms of conduct for audit committees and legal
counsel, but they have done so without using increased director exposure to
legal liability as a goal or sanction. These reforms have "fleshed out"
responsibilities of audit committees in a way state law never has, while still
honoring the board and committee governance system established by state
law and, importantly, largely leaving to state law the responsibility of
evaluating committee performance and determining the personal liability
consequences of faulty performance by audit committee members.
Third, there are several ways in which the federal law and SRO
mandates on audit committees may intersect with, or be "translated" into,
state corporate law concepts. Several of these interactions are examined
below.
B. The Allocation ofAudit Oversight Responsibility
Notwithstanding federal and SRO mandates on audit committee
composition and functions, the committee's legal position within the
corporation's governance structure, and its relationship to the board of
directors, is still prescribed by state law. Section 205 of Sarbanes-Oxley
adds a new section 3(a)(58), to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
defines an audit committee as a committee "established by and amongst the
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board of directors. 67 The board of directors thus creates the audit
committee, delegates audit oversight responsibility to it, and may rely on
the committee. It would seem as well that the board itself ultimately
remains responsible for discharging the audit oversight function,
notwithstanding that the federal definition of an audit committee provides
that the committee has "the purpose of overseeing the accounting and
financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial
statements of the issuer.,
68
C. Evaluation ofAudit Committees
The SEC and the SROs are responsible for assessing audit committee
compliance with their respective mandates, but the board of directors and
the audit committee itself are subject to evaluation under state law as well.
Each body must discharge its specified responsibilities (for example,
neither can abdicate nor fail to act, as it should) and the committee, on an
ongoing basis, must evaluate its performance. All of this must be done in
conformance to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith. For
example, SRO rules mandate, among other requirements, that independent
directors meet in regularly scheduled sessions and that boards determine
whether a particular director is truly independent. These functions must be
carried out because of SRO rules but they must also be carried out in
compliance with state law fiduciary duties. Moreover, the proliferation of
audit committee charters-some quite detailed-provides another means by
which audit committees must guide their self-examination, and by which
boards must evaluate audit committee discharge of delegated functions, and
to which courts (at the urging of plaintiffs' lawyers) may turn in assessing
how an audit committee measured up to fulfilling its own description of its
duties.
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 745, 773
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (Supp. II 2002); see also id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-76 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (describing audit committees as "a committee of the board of directors").
68. Id. § 205(a), 116 Stat. at 773-74.
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D. Fiduciary Duty Analysis ofAudit Committee Conduct Remains a State
Law Matter, But It Will Be Influenced By Federal and SRO Mandates
1. The Influence on Duty of Loyalty Analysis
a. The Concept of Independence
In regulating independent directors, Sarbanes-Oxley, the NYSE and
Nasdaq, consistent with their rules-based approach, provide more detailed
definitions of "independence" than does the state law standard.69 State
decisional law essentially asks whether "a director is, for any substantial
reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of the
corporation in mind., 70 This involves, as one aspect, determining whether a
director is under the domination or control of an interested party,71 or is
financially or personally "beholden" to an interested party. 2 The inquiry is
not limited to specified relationships, however, and can be quite broad
ranging. A court will consider, where specific factual allegations support
concern, whether financial ties or personal or professional friendships may
raise reasonable doubts as to independence.7 3 Moreover, a court will not
only evaluate various relationships between committee members and an
interested party, it will examine whether committee members in fact
functioned independently.74 Also, Justice Jack Jacobs (sitting as Vice
Chancellor) recently noted the importance of a board committee having
knowledgeable, unconflicted advisors.7 5 The independence inquiry arises in
numerous settings, including, for example, in the judicial review of a
special litigation committee's handling of derivative litigation, 6 and in the
review of a board or committee's approval of a transaction with another
director.7 7 A court will more deferentially review director decisions in those
69. But see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1.02(15) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (defining
the term "Independent" for a director or other person in detail).
70. In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch. 2003).
71. In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d 342,355 & n.19 (Del. Ch. 1998).
72. Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 938-39.
73. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049
(Del. 2004).
74. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Del. 1997) (stating it is the "care,
attention and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of one's duties... that
generally touches on independence" (alteration in original) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 816 (Del. 1984))).
75. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc., No. CIV.A.16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *33 (Del. Ch.
May 3, 2004) (discussing independence).
76. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,815-16 (Del. 1984).
77. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV.A.11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *11-12 (Del. Ch.
May 24, 2000).
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settings-and, likely, in the audit committee setting as well-if the majority
of acting directors are disinterested and independent.78
The more detailed, rules-based definitions adopted by the NYSE and
Nasdaq certainly govern as to the composition of the board itself and of the
audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees, about which
state law says little. They do not, however, preempt state fiduciary
standards of independence. Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley only addresses
independence of the audit committee, not the board itself or any other board
committees. 79 The NYSE rules, moreover, specifically state that they
tighten the definition of "independent director" for purposes of those
standards.8°
Moreover, the focus of NYSE and Nasdaq definitions is to assure that
there is no improper relationship of directors to the company. Senior
management greatly influence financial relationships with the company
and, consequently, senior management may influence any director with
such a material relationship. Delaware's inquiry looks both at
disinterestedness (not mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley or SRO rules and
meaning a lack of a conflicting interest) and independence, and as to the
latter, pointedly focuses on whether a director is independent of the
interested party who has a conflict. One way a director might not be
independent is through a direct or indirect (such as familial) relationship
with the company, but it may happen in other ways as well. For example, a
director of a company about to engage in a transaction with the director's
best friend-whether or not the best friend also is a director-does not
automatically disqualify the director from being considered independent
under NYSE and Nasdaq rules, because he has no improper relationship to
the company. The director may not be independent under Delaware law,
however, which looks at beholdenness growing out of not only financial but
also "personal or other relationships" with the interested party.8' State law
standards applicable to directors, generally, and audit committee members,
specifically, on the issue of independence should not be considered to be
78. Id. at *11-13; see also In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917, 928-48 (Del. Ch. 2003).
79. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002)).
80. See Robert Todd Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1514 (2002) (stating that governance standards "do
not impact the overall preeminence of state corporate law").
81. Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 938-39; see also Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 984 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff'd, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del.
2004) ("[W]ith a bit more detail about the 'relationships,' 'friendships,' and 'inter-connections'
among Stewart and the other defendants ... there may have been a reasonable doubt as to one or
all of the outside directors [sic] disinterest, independence, or ability to consider and respond to
demand free from improper extraneous influences.").
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preempted in the fiduciary duty context. There simply is no express
intention for federal law or SRO rules to "occupy the field" in this area, nor
is it the case that it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law
on this subject or that state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of federal purposes. There now is, to be sure, dual regulation of directors,
but that does not mean, for fiduciary duty purposes, that states are
foreclosed from applying their own standards of independence. Legal
counsel must not be lulled into believing that directors and audit committee
members are "out of the woods" on the independence issue if they do not
run afoul of SRO rules.
b. Self-Dealing; Related Party Transactions
The Nasdaq rule-Rule 4350(h)82-that a company's audit committee
or other independent board committee must approve all related-party
transactions does not preempt the state law duty of loyalty governing such
transactions because a state may adhere to its own standards for fiduciary
duty purposes, but it will likely have that practical effect in substantial part.
Currently, under Delaware law,83 a director conflict of interest transaction
may be substantially immunized from attack on loyalty grounds either by
taking, usually in advance, certain procedural safeguards-such as making
full disclosure of all material facts and obtaining independent and
disinterested director approval,84 or obtaining stockholder ratification, or by
the interested party later proving the entire fairness of the transaction to the
corporation. Under the Nasdaq rule, approval is mandatory. If done
properly, this procedure also will lead to more deferential judicial review
for state law fiduciary duty purposes. Specifically, such pre-approved
transactions with directors will be reviewed under the business judgment
rule, not the stricter "entire fairness" standard.85 Nonetheless, if for some
reason the mandatory Nasdaq procedures were not followed, state fiduciary
duty law would still allow the director to prove the fairness of the
transaction to the company for the purposes of determining compliance
with state fiduciary standards. Moreover, the Nasdaq rule only governs
"transactions." 86 Consequently, director or officer actions such as usurping
a corporate opportunity, competing with the company, or improperly using
corporate assets and information-all of which also implicate the duty of
82. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers (NASD) Marketplace Rule 4350(h), NASD Manual (CCH)
5232 (2003).
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
84. Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV.A. 11134,2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000).
85. Id.at*13n.41.
86. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers (NASD) Marketplace Rule 4350(h), NASD Manual (CCH)
5232 (2003).
[Vol. 47:27
ETHICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES
loyalty-will continue to be governed, in law and practice, only by state
law fiduciary standards.
2. The Influence on Duty of Care and Good Faith Analysis
Sarbanes-Oxley and SRO rules impose certain direct responsibilities
on those directors who are members of a company's audit committee, such
as engaging an outside auditor, overseeing the auditor's work, responding
to reports from the CEO and CFO concerning internal control problems and
from legal counsel concerning evidence of securities law or fiduciary duty
violations, and authorizing the services to be performed by the auditor.
87
Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC rules also mandate identification of any financial
expert on the audit committee.88 In addition, SEC rules under section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley define "internal control over financial reporting" as a
process for providing "reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of
financial reporting," requiring such a process to be "effected by the issuer's
board of directors" after being designed by the CEO and CFO. 89 These new
federal responsibilities, and others, may influence analysis of the fiduciary
duties of care and good faith. These significant new audit committee
functions will require a substantial amount of time and are likely to be
included within those substantive director functions that must be discharged
with due care and good faith, under state fiduciary duty law. Moreover,
audit committees will need to develop procedures for evaluating, on an
ongoing basis, how they are performing their new functions. Those
procedures themselves may form part of the committee members' duty of
care.
More specifically, the reasonableness standard for internal controls
may be a higher standard than that adopted in the common reading of
Caremark, although that opinion is replete with references to
reasonableness. 90 The fact that public company directors must, as a matter
of federal law, adopt controls affording reasonable assurance does not
necessarily displace the due care fiduciary standard of state law.
Nonetheless, faced with a claim that a Delaware company failed to comply
with the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley on internal controls, Delaware courts,
especially when reminded of the several references to reasonableness in
Caremark itself, may be hard pressed, in the right case, not to draw on, or
87. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301, 302, 307, 116 Stat. 745,
775-77, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7241, 7245 (Supp. 112002)).
88. Id. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) (2004); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
90. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970-71 (Del. Ch. 1996).
2005]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
be influenced by, federal mandates as the applicable state law fiduciary
standard in the monitoring context. Essentially, depending on the reading
given the term reasonable, this would amount to a negligence standard,
though state courts could require greater culpability. Moreover, recent case
law indicates that deliberate or reckless failure in, or indifference toward,
discharging director functions in this area may be construed as a breach of
good faith, as would any significant deviations from oversight conduct
thought essential if directors truly were motivated to advance corporate
interests, the hallmark of good faith. As noted earlier, recent judicial
developments and judicial commentary indicate a growing sympathy for
shareholder assertions that director misconduct implicates the duty of good
faith.91 Consequently, even if courts do not modify their due care analysis
under the influence of federal law, they may regard more egregious director
or audit committee deviations from federal and SRO mandates as breaching
the duty of good faith. Recall too, that any knowing director failure to
comply with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley may violate the duty of
good faith.92 In this way, state fiduciary analysis would be influenced by
federal initiatives, but not controlled by them. This is significant from a
liability perspective as well, because breach of good faith, unlike breach of
due care, allows a judgment for money damages against directors under
Delaware law.
If Caremark is read to require-for liability purposes-a showing that
directors were "conscious" of the fact that they were not doing their jobs, as
suggested by Vice Chancellor Strine in Guttman v. Huang,93 then federal
and SRO rules may affect audit committee member liability in two further
ways. First, in today's post-reform world, audit committee members know a
great deal about what their jobs entail, thanks to the counsel of lawyers.
Second, there is more to the job of being an audit committee member,
thanks to federal and SRO mandates. Having more to do and knowing more
about what one is supposed to do means that a member failing to do what is
required is more likely to be found to be conscious of that failure. The
lesson is that audit committee members who fail to do what they know they
should do face a heightened risk of state law liability.
Some comfort can be taken in the Vice Chancellor's conclusion in
Guttman that the plaintiffs failed to state a Caremark claim because there
were no contentions that:
[T]he company lacked an audit committee, that the company had an
audit committee that met only sporadically and devoted patently
91. See supra Part IV.B.4.
92. Id.
93. 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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inadequate time to its work, or that the audit committee had clear
notice of serious accounting irregularities and simply chose to ignore
them or, even worse, to encourage their continuation.
94
Signaling what conduct he expects would meet the fiduciary standard,
Strine continued:
For all I know, the NVIDIA audit committee met six times a year for
half-day sessions, was comprised entirely of independent directors,
had retained a qualified and independent audit firm that performed no
other services for the company, was given no notice of the alleged
irregularities by either management or the audit firm, had paid its
audit firm to perform professionally credible random tests of
management's integrity in recording revenue and other important
financial data, and could not have been expected to discover the
accounting irregularities, even when exercising a good faith effort,
because discovery required disclosure by management or uncovering
by the auditors of conduct deep below the surface of the financial
statements.
95
Post-reform, well-functioning audit committees should easily meet that
standard.
3. Responsibility for Failure of the Audit Oversight Function
One question that will arise in the monitoring area will be whether all
directors or only members of the audit committee face liability for oversight
lapses associated with faulty internal controls or other breakdowns in
oversight of the audit function. Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley places direct
statutory responsibilities on the audit committee, thereby appearing to
override statutes such as section 8.25(d) of the Model Business Corporation
Act, which provides: "To the extent specified by the board of directors or in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws, each committee may exercise the
powers of the board of directors under section 8.01.,,96 This statute makes
the empowerment of committees a board function. Section 301 of Sarbanes-
Oxley also states, however, that the specified responsibilities are reposed in
the audit committee "as a committee of the board of directors., 97 Moreover,
section 205 of Sarbanes-Oxley defines the audit committee as a committee
"established by and amongst the board of directors. 98 This language
appears to be designed to honor the state law ordained board and committee
94. Id. at 507.
95. Id.
96. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(d) (2002).
97. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (Supp. II 2002)).
98. Id. § 205, 116 Stat. at 773 (codified at § 78c(a)(58)(A)).
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structure. Although Delaware does not have such a statute, section 8.25(f)
of the Model Business Corporation Act99 makes clear that delegation of
authority to, or action by, a committee of the board does not alone
constitute compliance with a director's duty of care: "The creation of,
delegation of authority to, or action by a committee does not alone
constitute compliance by a director with the standards of conduct described
in section 8.30.''1°° Thus, directors not on the audit committee-or any of
the other committees mandated by NYSE and Nasdaq rules--do not satisfy
their fiduciary duties simply by delegation to that committee. They continue
to have state law monitoring and oversight responsibilities. This will
continue to be the case even though Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, and Nasdaq
rules impose certain duties on the audit, compensation and
nominating/governance committees, specifically. At the same time, both the
Model Act and Delaware's statute allow a director to rely on committees of
the board of directors.' 0' Thus, provided the good faith and reasonableness
conditions of those director-reliance statutes are met, directors not on a
mandated committee should not face liability for misconduct by the
mandated committee, as opposed to liability for their own misconduct in
relation to the activities of the audit and other mandated committees.
4. Liability ofAudit Committee Financial Expert
As to the liability standard for the audit committee financial expert, the
SEC adopting release states that it does not contemplate greater liability
under federal or state law for that person.
We find no support in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or in related
legislative history that Congress intended to change the duties,
obligations or liability of any audit committee member, including the
audit committee financial expert, through [section 407].
... Our new rule provides that whether a person is, or is not, an
audit committee financial expert does not alter his or her duties,
obligations or liabilities. We believe this should be the case under
federal and state law.'
0 2
99. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(f) (2002).
100. Id.
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(e).
102. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 5110, 5116-17 (proposed Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and
249). Section 228.40 1(e)(4)(ii) provides that "designation or identification of a person as an audit
committee financial expert... does not impose on such person any duties, obligations or liability"
that are greater than would be the case in the absence of such designation and providing that such
designation or identification also does not affect the duties, obligations or liability of other
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This liability "safe harbor"' 3 was not expressly provided for by
Sarbanes-Oxley. Moreover, the safe harbor addresses only designation or
identification, not the issue of actual conduct by the expert. 10 4 Finally,
absent preemption-for which there is no basis-state law, not federal law,
will govern the liability for fiduciary wrongdoing by the financial expert
and other audit committee members. The SEC rule will have no ipso facto
dispositive legal force in that setting.
Nonetheless, a director having a specialized background may find that
background relevant in any judicial assessment of his or her compliance
with the duty of care. 10 5 This language may apply to members of the audit
committee and other mandated committees as well. Moreover, alleged
failures by an audit committee financial expert to act in conformance with
accepted standards and practices-as these continue to develop-may be
open to proof by expert witness evidence on evolving customs and practices
in corporate governance. Extreme departures from such standards of
practice (as these develop) may also raise a good faith issue. For the non-
experts on the committee, as to specialized financial matters they may be
able to rely on the financial expert under director-reliance statutes,
10 6
although those state law provisions are in some tension with section 301 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, which confers responsibility on the committee itself.
10 7
Still, the language describing the audit committee as a "committee of the
board" suggests a federal intention to honor state law governance of the
relationship between the committee and board.'0 8
Similarly, the American Law Institute's ("ALl") Principles of
Corporate Governance note that the phrase "in a like position"
acknowledges that "the nature and extent of the functions to be performed
by a director or officer will vary with the tasks that have been imposed on
the director or officer by law or by the corporation, or voluntarily assumed"
and also is "intended to recognize that the special skills, background, or
expertise of a director or officer may entail greater responsibility."'
0 9
members of the audit committee or the board of directors. Id. at 5126.
103. Id.
104. See id
105. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 2 (2002) (stating that the statutory phrase "in a
like position... under similar circumstances" means "the special background, qualifications, and
management responsibilities of a particular director may be relevant in evaluating that director's
compliance with the standard of care" (alteration in original)).
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261-62 (Del. 2000).
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2) (Supp. 112002)).
108. Id.
109. AMERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. e (1994).
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Moreover, a director with special skills, background or expertise may have
greater responsibility whether or not he or she is designated as an expert. A
recent decision of the Delaware Chancery Court, 10 demonstrates this point.
In that case, which involved both a statutory appraisal and a class action
asserting breach of fiduciary duty growing out of a "going private"
transaction,"' Justice Jack Jacobs (sitting in Chancery, by designation) held
that a director/committee member with specialized expertise (here, financial
expertise) could not defend simply by asserting he had relied on an opinion
of the committee's investment bankers. 12 Justice Jacobs first noted the
director's substantial financial experience, which he found to be equivalent,
if not superior, to that of the banker, and then rejected the director's reliance
argument as implausible." 3 That determination, in turn, led Jacobs to
conclude the director knew or should have known the purchase price was
unfair. 1 14 Jacobs found that by voting to approve the transaction
nonetheless, the director had acted for personal motives, which violated his
duty of loyalty and good faith, for which he was personally liable." 5
5. The Continued Importance. of the Business Judgment Rule
As to those responsibilities where the audit committee acts by making
decisions, assuming the decision is a business judgment, the business
judgment rule should apply. Examples would include committee decisions
to hire an auditor, approving audit services, preparing audit committee
reports, and deciding how to respond to deficiencies in the internal controls
or elsewhere in the audit oversight area, including those revealed by CEO
and CFO certifications." 6 Where the audit committee has responsibilities,
but does not exercise business judgment, the business judgment rule is
inapplicable. Examples may include supervision of the auditor and
reviewing information prepared by management or by the independent
auditor. Fiduciary duties continue to govern conduct by the audit committee
in these areas.
110. See In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc., No. CIV.A.16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39-40
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
111. Id. at * 1.




116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 777
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (Supp. 112002)).
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6. Little Current Case Law on Audit Committee Member Liability or
Access to Corporate Investigations; the Dynamic Nature of Fiduciary
Duties
There is relatively little case law on the liability of audit committee
members; much of that law, moreover, deals with liability under the federal
securities laws.' 17
The Delaware Chancery Court has considered whether a plaintiff can
use section 220 of the Delaware corporate statute (the "books and records"
statute) 118 to obtain the results of an audit committee's investigation into
possible wrongdoing, where the committee used legal counsel and asserted
attomey-client privilege and work product protection. In Chinn v.
Endocare, Inc., the chancery court held that a forensic accounting report
prepared for the audit committee at the direction of the committee's legal
counsel was not protected because it was shared with the outside accounting
firm that was under investigation. 19 In Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
disclosure under section 220 was denied as to materials given to the SEC
under a confidentiality agreement.
20
Although currently undeveloped, it can reasonably be expected that
case law will grow as state law fiduciary duties are reinterpreted in light of
recent federal and SRO changes and altered expectations of directors and
audit committee members. Along this line, it is worth recalling both an
obscure, but telling, comment in the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance and a more prominent statement by Vice Chancellor Strine.
The ALI comment states: "[T]he 'duty' . . . component[] of duty of care
provisions [is] . . . flexible and dynamic .... [O]bligations may change
over time to reflect new conditions or revised business practices or mores.
Duty of care provisions should be interpreted in the light of contemporary
conditions.'' Vice Chancellor Strine stated: "Enron might exert pressure
117. See Kevin lurato, Comment, Warning! A Position on the Audit Committee Could Mean
Greater Exposure to Liability: The Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of Care to the
Corporate Audit Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977, 987-97 (2001) (collecting cases); John F.
Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097, 1104 n.35
(1998) (collecting cases). But see In re JWP, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(denying audit committee members summary judgment on aiding and abetting common law fraud
claim).
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2004).
119. No. CIV.A.20262, 2003 WL 21517869, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2003), aff'd, 829 A.2d
935 (Del. 2003).
120. See No. CIV.A.18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *11-12, *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2002).
But see McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 815, 821 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (compelling disclosure of documents given to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement).
121. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. b (1994); see also Paul H. Dawes, Caremark and the
Duty of Care, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, 219, 225 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
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on courts to look more carefully at whether directors have made a good
faith effort to accomplish their duties."'
' 22
VII. MISCELLANEOUS STATE LAW CHANGES
States have responded to concerns about corporate corruption in a
variety of ways. For example, a couple of states now follow Sarbanes-
Oxley in regulating loans. Colorado, for example, prohibits loans to
members of the board of directors. 123 Ohio law now provides that issuers
filing registration statements with the division of securities must require
that any outstanding loan to an officer, director, five percent shareholders,
managers, trustee or general partner must be repaid within six months of
offering securities. 124 Any future loan to those persons must be for a bona
fide business purpose and must be approved by a majority of disinterested
directors, managers, trustees or general partners. 125 Under Connecticut law,
the CEO and CFO of each publicly held corporation must certify financial
statements. 126 Illinois makes interfering with an audit a violation of state
securities law.
127
VIII. RETHINKING THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL ROLES OF CORPORATE
LAWYERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Audit Committee Reform and the Corporate Lawyer's Ethical Role
Audit committee reforms-whether from Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC rules
or SRO rules-reflect a perception that our corporate governance system
broke down in the late 1990s. These reforms reflect a sharp break from the
longstanding belief that boards of directors-given wide latitude under state
Handbook Series No. B- 1199, 2000) ("That directors owe their organizations a duty of due care is
a venerated standard of business law, widely if not universally accepted by the legal and financial
community. The understanding of what that duty entails, however, has changed significantly over
time." (emphasis added)); JEREMY BACON & JAMES K. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 75 (1975) (discussing a
director's duty of care and stating that "due care is flexible"; that "circumstances which may be
relevant in any particular case" in determining the obligations imposed by the duty of care,
including "the general customs or ways of doing things in the particular type of business").
122. Strine, supra note 41, at 1373.
123. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 388, § 1, 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 2527-28.
124. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.131 (LexisNexis 2004).
125. Id. § 1707.131(C)(2)(b).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1333 (West Supp. 2005).
127. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12(L) (West Supp. 2005); see also Timothy A. French &
Larry D. Soderquist, State Responses to Corporate Corruption: Thirteen Mini Sarbanes-Oxley
Acts, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 168, 168-76 (2004) (summarizing the myriad of state law responses to
Sarbanes-Oxley).
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law-will, for the most part, eventually adopt healthy governance practices.
These reforms wrest from the boards and senior officers some of their long-
held discretion over the audit function. The audit function, essentially, is
about developing well-functioning processes for generating full, reliable
company information-information about financial and compliance
matters. By specifying the composition and certain functions of audit
committees, federal law and SRO rules hone in on audit committees as a
central mechanism in this vital information generating function.
This development parallels the new focus on the lawyer's role in
corporate governance. Just as reformers feared "capture" of auditors by
senior management, so they feared capture of corporate counsel. Section
307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC reporting up rule seek to reemphasize
the lawyer's legal role as counsel to the corporation, and redirect the norms
of lawyer behavior and professional self-identity away from representing
senior management and toward representing the corporate enterprise itself.
Thus, lawyers with "evidence" of wrongdoing-key corporate
information-must, if lacking an appropriate response by the CEO or CLO,
take that information to the audit committee or board of directors. How
audit committees and boards at large numbers of companies respond to
reports of wrongdoing will likely influence whether the SEC adopts a
further rule requiring that lawyers "report out" those misdeeds. For now,
lawyers are charged with transmitting one particular kind of internal
corporate information to the all important audit committee--evidence of
legal wrongdoing. That the audit committee itself is permitted to retain its
own separate legal counsel simultaneously reflects lingering concern over
the allegiance of corporate counsel and underscores the audit committee's
pivotal role in corporate decision-making and, hence, its need for
independent counsel.
These legal rules--controversial within the business bar-can be
expected, over time, to influence how lawyers perceive their own
professional roles. It is likely that lawyers not only will more self-
consciously identify themselves as lawyers for "the board" or "the audit
committee"-rather than "management"--but also that, over time,
corporate lawyers, unlike litigators, will, as to internal governance matters,
develop stronger identities as "gatekeepers" and not purely "advocates."
Those lawyers desiring to retain as their professional identity the more
traditional role of advocate, may more sharply identify themselves as
advocates for the enterprise, not for senior officers who may, at times, act at
odds with corporate interests.
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B. Corporate Lawyers and the Limits of Ethical Rules
In his insightful new book on the fall of Milbank, Tweed bankruptcy
lawyer John Gellene, Professor Milton C. Regan, Jr. 128 explores reasons
why corporate/transactional lawyers may tolerate conflicts of interest in
corporate representation. He identifies three chief reasons why, historically,
conflicts may be considered less urgent by corporate lawyers than by
litigators. 129 First, professional rules speak more explicitly and clearly to
litigation than to corporate work; 130 second, transactional clients tend to be
more tolerant of conflicts; 131 and third, transactional lawyers work closely
with investment bankers who have tended to be lenient about conflicts.
132
In the past, corporate lawyers might have found murkier constraints as
to their responsibilities in professional rules, drawing instead on widespread
conventions and practices; clients might have tolerated conflicts to lower
transaction costs and to gain a reputational intermediary with extensive
contacts who could enhance trust and cooperation and ease the task of
finding common ground in negotiated transactions. Lawyer and client
beliefs about professional responsibilities are now undergoing fundamental
rethinking. 1
33
128. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
314 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2004).




133. Other helpful resources: LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING,
FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4th ed., West Group 2004); MARC I. STEINBERG,
LAWYERING AND ETHICS FOR THE BUSINESS ATTORNEY (West Group 2002); Roger C. Cramton,
George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley,
49 VILL. L. REv. 725 (2004); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical
Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9 (2003).
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APPENDIX
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (e) (2001).
§ 141. Board of directors; powers; number, qualifications, terms and
quorum; committees; classes of directors; nonprofit corporations;
reliance upon books; action without meeting; removal.
(e) A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such
member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers
or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other
person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other
person's professional or expert competence and who has been selected with
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.41 (D) (Vernon
Supp. 2004-2005).
Art. 2.41. Liability of Directors and Shareholders in Certain Cases
D. In the discharge of any duty imposed or power conferred upon a
director, including as a member of a committee, the director, may in good
faith and with ordinary care, rely on information, opinions, reports, or
statements, including financial statements and other financial data,
concerning the corporation or another person, that were prepared or
presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, investment bankers, or other
persons as to matters the director reasonably believes are within the
person's professional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a
member.
A director is not relying in good faith within the meaning of this
Section if the director has knowledge concerning the matter in question that
makes reliance otherwise permitted by this Section unwarranted.
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